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Biographical Note 
 
Sol Linowitz was born in Trenton, New Jersey in 1913 to immigrant parents. His father was a 
successful fruit importer.  He went to Hamilton College, and studied philosophy and German.  
At Hamilton, he met Elihu Root, who advised him to go on to law school.  He graduated from 
Cornell Law School in 1935.  Linowitz has had a distinguished career since, serving as a 
successful lawyer and chairman of the board at Xerox.  He later served as U.S. Ambassador to 
the Organization of American Sates, Ambassador to Middle East peace negotiations, and was a 
co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaty.  He also practiced law until his retirement in 1994.  
He was a close advisor to Edmund Muskie during his pre idential campaigns and his tenure as 
Secretary of State. 
 
 
Scope and Content Note 
 
Interview includes discussions of: Muskie in law school; seeing Muskie after his election to the 
Senate; relationship with Muskie after 1966; meeting with Muskie at the F Street Club; advising 
Muskie on foreign policy during the presidential campaigns and as Secretary of State; Muskie’s 
resolution of problems at the State Department; Muskie’  attitude toward the Vietnam War; 
Latin America; and the trip to the Middle East. 
 
 
Indexed Names 
 
Begin, Menachem, 1913-1992 
Ben-Gurion, David, 1886-1973 
Bernhard, Berl 
Carter, Jimmy, 1924- 
Heikal,  Mohamed Hassanein 
Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973 
Kollek, Teddy 
Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865 
Linowitz, Sol M., 1913- 
Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001 
Meir, Golda, 1898-1978 
Muskie, Edmund S., 1914-1996 
Muskie, Jane Gray 
Nicoll, Don 
Peres, Shimon, 1923- 
Reston, James 
Sadat, Anwar, 1918-1981 
Sadat, Jihan, 1933- 
Shamir, Yitzhak, 1915- 
Shepherd, Bob 
Weizman, Ezer, 1924-2005 
 
 
Transcript 
 
Don Nicoll:   It is Tuesday, the 2nd of May, the year 2000.  We are at the Academy for 
Educational Development in Washington, D.C., eleven o’clock in the morning with the second 
interview of Ambassador Sol Linowitz.  The interview r is Don Nicoll.  Ambassador, the first 
time we talked you gave us some background on your own education and decision to go to law 
school, and then meeting a young Ed Muskie who was a freshman in your senior year at law 
school.  And at that time, as I recall, you were th editor of the yearbook. 
 
Sol Linowitz:   Of the Law Review. 
 
DN:   Of the Law Review, excuse me, I’m in the wrong department. (laughter)  And you 
indicated then that Ed was a shy student and didn’t push himself very much.  When did you meet 
him again? 
 
SL:   After law school.  I think I met him a couple of times, next met him a couple of times in 
connection with law school get-togethers, alumni associations and so forth.  And I, even though 
he was not much of an organization type, he was interes ed enough in keeping his contacts with 
the law school, and I think that’s when I picked up again with him. 
 
DN:   And did you encounter him while he was governor of Maine? 
 
SL:    Sporadically I would see him, it was never on any fixed basis.  But I always had a real 
regard and affection for him.  Our experience together at the law school was always there and I 
could always get a chuckle out of reminding him of s me of things or some of the people and so 
forth.  It was quite clear that Ed Muskie had no idea of going into politics.  And as I may have 
said before, if we had had a vote on the guy at the law school least likely to become a politician, 
he would have won hands down.  He was not one who touted his own virtues or values, but he 
was a strict disciplinarian and, which went along with his shyness.  He, as I remember, he never 
made an effort to reach out to people.  That was true as long as I knew him.  You came to Ed 
Muskie.  Ed Muskie didn’t go to you, as I remember. 
 
DN:   You mention his being a strict disciplinarian.  Was that disciplining himself? 
 
SL:    Yes, yes.  We shared an uncomfortable characteristic.  We never thought we had done 
very well on examinations.  We always anticipated that we wouldn’t be among the high ranking 
graduates of the law school.  Ed was a head shaker.  H  would come out of an exam with a look 
on his face that indicated that Armageddon had arrived, and with that grouchy effort to indicate 
how bad it was.  He would like to put to you, if you knew him well enough or a friend of his, he 
would intersperse with a few profane words how lousy he had done and how bad it was going to 
be and so forth. 
 
And of course it never was.  He was always smart and that’s how he got on the Law Review.  So 
far as I know, he did not have friends that stayed with him during that period because it’s not that 
he was resisted, it was simply that, he had his own idea of how to work with people, quietly, 
thoughtfully, but objectively.  So that’s the - 
 
DN:   When you, you saw him intermittently when he was governor, when he came to the 
Senate, did you see more of him? 
 
SL:    Yes, much more.  I really at the beginning had no idea how he got into politics, and we 
would talk about that.  He used to talk about the, I guess it was the, I can’t remember what his 
father did but it was, made it possible for Ed to rent space.  And I recall, I never saw this, but I 
remember Ed chuckling as he talked about the, you kn w, as he talked about the incredulity with 
which he recognized that he had become a politician.  A d he liked to be kidded about that. 
 
DN:   Did, do you recall what he said brought him to be a politician?  Do you remember what he 
said brought him to be a politician? 
 
SL:    I can’t recall specifics in exact words, but he demanded so much of himself and therefore 
of other people too, the discipline that he imposed on himself and on others so that he, when he 
first came to the senate he was incredulous that here he was as an elected official in the senate.  
Remember, when he came it was a big year, was it ‘60? 
 
DN:   Fifty-eight. 
 
SL:    Fifty-eight.  He certainly was open-eyed when h came and I remember seeing him not 
long after he was elected and he said to me once, as I think of it, “I don’t know what the hell I’m 
doing in this anyway.” 
 
Now there’s a story around that time, I can’t be sure it happened or that someone told me.  I 
think I was involved as I’ll tell you in a moment, but it was interesting and significant and I 
remembered it for that reason but not quite sure how I got the story.  I was in Rochester, New 
York, and one day I got a phone call from Ed Muskie.  He would like to see me and was I going 
to be in Washington.  And I said, “No, I’m not going to be in Washington.”  He said, “Well then 
I’ll come and see you.”  And he took the plane and came to Rochester and he said to me, this I 
remember, he said to me that he had decided he was going to quit the Senate and he wanted to 
talk to somebody who would help give him an objective view of what was involved.  And he 
thought that I might do it because he knew he could tr st my judgment or something nice like 
that. 
 
He said that the reason this had come to a head, and he was clear that this was the right course 
for him, was that Jane had been shopping in a, one of these giant food stores, I can’t remember 
now which one.  And she was coming through the line a d she gave the clerk a check for the 
amount that she had bought and they refused to take it.  Just looked at it and said, “We can’t take 
this,” whatever the reason.  And she said, “My husband is a Senator.”  And the clerk, it is my 
recollection, said, “Look lady, we got a hundred of them around here.”  And that gave him a 
feeling of not sure that he had done the right thing in which his wife was treated with disrespect. 
 Interesting in the light of the subsequent tears or non tears later on.  But I remember that, as I 
say I can’t be sure of the details, but the point was that they mistreated her, they embarrassed 
her.  She came, maybe she cried a little, but all of a sudden this was not the Garden of Eden. 
 
DN:   Was this fairly early in his time in the Senate? 
 
SL:    Yes. 
 
DN:   And when was it that you left Xerox? 
 
SL:    Nineteen sixty-six. 
 
DN:   So you, and you came to Washington at that time.  And after that encounter, what advice 
did you give, by the way, when Ed asked you about leaving? 
 
SL:    Oh, by the time he, you know, I said the obvious thing, “You’ll never again have the 
opportunity to pitch in for the things you believe in, and if you turn your back on this job you’re 
out of public life.”  And, “Are you sure that that’s what you really want or are you just teed off?” 
 Only I didn’t say teed off. 
 
DN:   And did you see him between then and 1966 when you came to Washington? 
 
SL:    Yeah, fuzzy, because I can’t remember how many times, so, but we kept up a relationship. 
 He was not a great letter writer, as I remember, so that most of the time you’d talk to him by 
phone if you wanted to have a conversation.  If you waited for him to send you a letter about 
something he said he would do, you know this better than I, he was not a guy who would follow 
through on a - 
 
DN:   Letters were not his thing.  And starting in ‘66when you were in Washington, and at that 
point you were involved in foreign policy, did you have any professional encounters related to 
your work?  Or were they again ‘old friend from law school days’? 
 
SL:    I did not, that I can recall, have any significant official relationship with him.  I was an 
ambassador to the American, to the Organization of American States and when I would see Ed, 
he’d want to know how things are going, what am I doing and we would kid around about who 
was doing the more important job.  It was that sortof thing, at some point in that period. 
 
But I don’t think I ever made the effort to crystallize or put together in a form that would 
correctly reflect the nature of our relationship.  It was, well you, I don’t know whether, when you 
were with Ed? 
 
DN:   I was with him from 19-, I had worked with him in Maine politics from ‘54 on, but I came 
on his staff in 1961 and was there until 1972, mid ‘72, and was his administrative assistant from 
‘62 to 1970. 
 
SL:    Oh, really? 
 
DN:   So during that period I was there in Washington, and he was not at that time on the foreign 
relations committee.  His only encounters with foreign policy came as a result of the Mansfield 
Mission on behalf of the president in connection with Vietnam when they had the round-the-
world trip.  And other than that, and some encounters with the Polish embassy during that 
period, we were not much engaged in foreign policy issues. 
 
SL:    To leapfrog, as you were talking just now, I’d almost forgotten this.  When Ed was 
secretary of state I saw more of him than I had before.  And his, Ed always was, he was a grouser 
and things were never quite good enough and, “Who the hell put this out?” and that sort of thing. 
 And you’d laugh about it because it was vintage Muskie.  But we got closer and he and I used to 
have lunch from time to time or just chat, chit-chat.  And then he became secretary of state, and 
we saw even more of each other then.  Not primarily, not primarily official, but involved with his 
interests and later his responsibility as secretary of state. 
 
One day, this indicates the nature of our relationship; one day Ed called me and said he’d like to 
have lunch.  I was a member then of the F Street Club and we had, several times, had lunch 
together upstairs.  You know the, F Street Club, well th y had rooms, private rooms upstairs, and 
he said he wanted to talk in private, he wanted to be sure it was in private.  And I said that I 
thought that was a good idea, and we could meet togher at 12:30 or whatever it was at the F 
Street Club.  So we went upstairs and I said to them that the secretary of state was going to be 
here and he’ll have his security people with him and so forth. 
 
And after we talked for a bit Ed said to me, (Jimmy Carter was then running) he said to me that 
he wanted to ask me something.  “If Carter is reelect d, would you be deputy secretary of state?” 
 And he said he had talked to the president about this and he thought that it would be helpful to 
him if he had someone he knew and trusted who could work with him and so forth.  And I said, 
“I’ll think about it.”  I didn’t jump at it.  I know he talked to Berl Bernhard about it, for example, 
what Berl thought.  And nothing became of it because Carter was not reelected.  But as I say, 
maybe that gives you some idea of the character of the relationship. 
 
DN:   During that period from 1968 to 19-, well particularly the 1968 to 1972 period when he 
was running for vice president and then for president, did he consult with you on foreign policy 
matters? 
 
SL:    Yes.  I think it’s fair to say that we did not at first figure out where he wanted me to be in 
connection with his own development and foreign policy experience.  He obviously loved the 
job of secretary of state, and he was very quick to seize upon a problem and want to shake it out. 
 And I was, because of our relationship over the years, I was never awed by him.  And I called 
him a grouch and that sort of thing, which he always chuckled about.  He didn’t take offense.  
And several times we talked, I can’t remember specifics, we talked and it was “no” say, to say to 
him he was dead wrong about something.  And he never, well he grunted and gave me the 
feeling that, “Where the hell had I picked up that kind of nonsense?”  But he, you could bring 
him around.  He was always open-minded, which I treasured, and as you knew very well. 
 
And it was a remarkable experience to see this man increasingly familiar with tough foreign 
policy issues affecting this country.  And I think, he used to say to me that he never got as much 
attention with all the time he was in the Senate, had never got as much attention as he did when 
he became secretary of state.  That was . . . . He almost gleefully said to me, “You know how 
much mail I get on this,” or something else.  He was delighted with the fact that he was a big 
event.  And of course the fact that his colleagues on the Hill were so warmly supportive insofar 
as I can recall now, and also those that he couldn’t stand. 
 
DN:   What struck you about the way he tackled those problems in the Department of State 
particularly at that tough time, dealing with Iran, and at the same time the problems of the Arabs 
and Israelis going on?  When he got into conversation with you, was there a particular pattern in 
the way he went after those issues, or sought your advice? 
 
SL:    My present recollection is that he was not a great eader in terms of . . . . That he was more 
a fellow who liked to talk it through, at least with me, rather than here’s a great article you ought 
to read or here’s that sort of thing.  My present feling is that he did not get his information that 
way.  It almost always, not always, but almost always, would call me to talk about some issue, 
whether it’s Vietnam or anything else, or Cuba, he would talk.  He would call me, or have 
someone call me and say, “The secretary wants to see you.”  And then I’d say, “Sure,” and “just 
say when.”  We went back to the F Street Club several times after that and talked, complete 
privacy.  I don’t know a special pattern that he followed, but I do know that it was great 
satisfaction to him to be the top foreign policy exp rt in the United States. 
 
DN:   Did you see much of a difference in the way he tackled the foreign policy issues when he 
was secretary of state from the time from ‘68 to ‘72 when he was seeking the vice presidency 
and the presidency, when he was really just trying to et a handle on foreign policy? 
 
SL:    I don’t know how to answer that.  I think my best recollection is that problems would 
descend upon him, or ascend over him, and to the extent there was a uniformity of approach.  He 
would want to be able to grill you with questions and zero in on things that he either did not 
understand or didn’t really have the background, an therefore was trying to play catch up a 
great deal of the time.  I think, looking back, that w s his modus operandi, that was how he did it 
in my relationship with him. 
 
DN:   Did you and he ever have any philosophical disagreements.  You’ve mentioned places 
where you thought he was wrong and told him so.  Were there any fundamental disagreements 
that you had on foreign policy?  Vietnam?  Middle East? 
 
SL:    We talked about both of those and he was gutsy about them.  He knew that the Middle 
East, for example, was a very explosive subject which ad all kinds of ramifications, including 
political.  But at least in our conversations, he didn’t move, back away from stating his position 
and felt very strongly that in the Middle East the United States had a role to play, and he didn’t 
think it was being played the way it should be.  But he didn’t go around looking for trouble, but 
if it was necessary to take a position, he took it honestly. 
 
On Vietnam, we shared a, privately between us we shared a dismay at what was going on.  Even 
when he was secretary of state as I remember, he may have kept to himself, I don’t remember 
now whether he was doing anything publicly in asserting positions on that, but there was no 
question that he chafed uncomfortably.  It was a very, again you know so well, it was a 
troublesome period and he came to realize that by gaining what he had, an importance in the 
foreign policy area, he was losing his opportunity to speak up publicly in disagreement with, for 
example, what Johnson was doing in ‘Nam.  But I don’t remember anything more specific than 
that about it. 
 
DN:   Your two great areas of international expertise were Latin America and the Middle East.  
Did he particularly seek you advice on Latin American issues, or did he show much interest in 
Latin America? 
 
SL:    Well except for some comments about Cuba, maybe one or two issues that have now 
disappeared so I can’t immediately give you an answer, but he was not a, the answer that I had 
been looking for.  He knew because I griped it all he time to him about the fact that the 
American people, as Scotty Reston said, “They’ll do anything for Latin America except read 
about it.”  And Ed was no different.  He faced the reality of knowing that if he took a position on 
some foreign policy, or some Latin American issue it might or might not make a difference and, 
if so, what difference?  I think that he wanted to be helpful, but I don’t think that he really 
wanted to get involved too much.  And that was the way he and his colleagues saw Latin 
America.  The Middle East was, as I said before, was the one where he took positions, but I 
don’t think he took them strongly and publicly. 
 
DN:   Did he talk to you at all after his 1971 trip to the Middle East and give you some of his 
impressions? 
 
SL:    Yeah, he did, and I disagreed with some things and agreed with some others.  He felt that 
the United States had a responsibility to help bring peace to the Middle East.  I think that his 
attitude at that juncture was that we may have been too favorable toward Israel and didn’t quite 
put it in those terms, but he came back with a different feeling than the one he took with him 
when he left. 
 
DN:   That was an extraordinary trip for him. 
 
SL:    You went with him? 
 
DN:   Yes. 
 
SL:    What happened on that trip, I don’t know. 
 
DN:   Well, the two major events really were, one, simply the, in addition to meeting Golda 
Maier and [David] Ben-Gurion and a young Ezer Weizman, Shimon Peres, Teddy Kollek, 
[Menachim] Begin, met Begin, and I think it was [Yitzhak] Shamir, in Begin’s apartment in Tel 
Aviv and listened to them one evening arguing among themselves about who did what during the 
Irgun period.  And, but in addition to catching a fl vor of Israeli politics at the time, it was the 
physical impact if you will of seeing how small Israel was and going up onto the Golan Heights 
and recognizing how vulnerable the country was militar y from the Syrian side.  That was one 
piece of it. 
 
The other was an evening with Anwar Sadat and Mrs. [Jihan] Sadat where they had a very 
relaxed and open exchange, followed by an appointment th  next day with [Mohammed 
Hassanein] Heikal, and having Heikal sort of feed back to him almost verbatim that conversation 
and realizing that Heikal had listened to a tape of the evening discussion.  And so he got both the 
sense of Sadat’s flexibility and the highly controlled society that that represented in the 
manipulation that was going on.  And at the time I f lt he came away with the sense that this 
was, and would continue to be, an extraordinarily complicated set of issues.  And he didn’t quite 
know how you sorted them out, even though we had a role to play, but it was impressions of 
people and impressions of geography, and not any great strategic sense of what needed to be 
done at the time.  That’s one reason I was wondering if you’d gotten any impression from him at 
the time as to what he was thinking.  He didn’t always share his innermost thoughts with staff. 
 
SL:    At one point, I don’t know when, before or after the trip and so forth, I remember his 
talking with excitement about the trip, how much he learned.  He’d been a little hesitant about 
doing it, said he didn’t know whether or not he could be helpful, whether or not it would be 
useful for him to be doing that.  But I can’t recall now whether it was before or after that we 
talked and this note of, I was going to say, urgency, about doing something that would be helpful 
to bringing peace in the Middle East. 
 
DN:   The one thing he did during that part of the trip was to carry a message from Golda Meir 
to Sadat, seeking the release of some Israeli airmen who had been captured.  That’s the one 
message I remember him carrying and pushing.  I don’t thi k anything happened with it, but he 
did push that. 
 
SL:    Of course, on the middle shelf, [pointing to a photograph on Ambassador Linowitz’s 
bookshelf] Sadat could make a believer out of you and Ed wanted to be a believer.  He’s one of 
the most exciting, talented people I’ve ever met, and he could have me eating out of his hand if I 
didn’t keep watching.  So for Ed to have been brought this close to this man he thought was a 
great man and an issue like the Middle East where h, by virtue of his office, became the central 
figure in moving one way or another was for Ed coming full circle.  And I loved to see his 
excitement about it. 
 
DN:   As you saw Ed and met with him during the period when he was seeking the presidential 
nomination, what sorts of impressions did you have of his psyche at the time, his response to the 
race, his feelings about the race? 
 
SL:    Well, here you have to help me because I can’t, whenever he did that television, televised 
speech where he was Abe Lincoln - 
 
DN:   Well that was 1970.  That was the congressional, during the congressional race in 1970. 
 
SL:    Oh, was it then? 
 
DN:   Where he was seated outside a home in the, yes, yeah.
 
SL:    I remember he was gleeful about that, he thought that that had been a ten strike.  And it 
was fantastic.  I never knew him to project before r after as he did in that speech.  He, I guess 
he never got over the fact that he was knocked out of the race by the New Hampshire weeping 
episode, whatever it was; bitter at the New Hampshire extremists who had done him in and 
wanted to get rid of him because they were afraid of him as a candidate.  He felt betrayed as I 
remember.  He had this hideaway office, and I used to go down there and talk with him, but for a 
long time he didn’t want to see me or I guess anybod  else.  I can’t remember who was his 
secretary at the time, encouraged me to invite him to do things.  He never would.  I would go 
into that dimly lit office with the lights on, and he sitting behind the desk, but he was carrying a 
heavy load. 
 
DN:   How long did it take him to shake that off? 
 
SL:    Quite a long time.  From my experience I want to say that six months to a year, I think.  I 
felt distressed when I did see him because he was flagellating himself, what did he do wrong, 
and,   “How could he let these sons-of-bitches,” do so and so.  It was sad. 
 
DN:   As you look back on Ed Muskie’s career, what are the things that strike you the most 
about his personality and his talents, and his streng hs and his weaknesses? 
 
SL:    Integrity, you have to say that.  You looked at the guy and you’d say, boy, if anybody ever 
had integrity that’s the guy.  He was a Puritan type.  He was not willing to trifle with truth.  I. . . . 
From when I first got to know him until his death, ere was for him no alternative to integrity.  
You said what you believed to be the truth.  You worked to help others see this truth as he saw it. 
 And he brought an objectivity and a willingness to keep an open mind that were quite rare. 
 
DN:   Thank you very much.  I’m sorry, but time is running out for us and you have another 
appointment. 
 
SL:    Yeah, I, we’ll have another chance to chat. 
 
DN:   I hope so.  Is - 
 
SL:    What are you going to do with this? 
 
DN:   We are transcribing the tapes - 
 
End of Interview 
